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Introduction
Belgium is not a significant safe haven for terrorist groups, according to the
2006 edition of the Country Reports on Terrorism, released by the U.S. State
Department in April 2007. Belgium is only a piece in a global puzzle of terror-
ism, including its jihadi variant that gained worldwide prominence with the 9/11
attacks.
In the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, Belgium bore its share of the bur-
den of terrorism, as did some of its neighbours. The Cellules Communistes
Combattantes were the Belgian branch of a Europe-wide movement of anti-
capitalist terrorism that caused widespread anxiety in public opinion. In the
mid-1980s, much earlier than most of its neighbours (with the exception of
France) Belgium then encountered a new variety of terrorists, religiously
inspired groups, linked with the Shia regime in Teheran. Subsequently in the
mid-1990s Belgian authorities discovered support cells of the Algerian radical
Islamist movement GIA on its soil. These were the beginnings of Belgium’s
encounter with jihadi terrorism.
Jihadi terrorism went through different mutations. It started as an ‘Islamo-
nationalist’ movement in the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. It then
acquired a global character, with al-Qaeda as the vanguard organisation of
international jihadi terrorism. As a result of international and national efforts
the organisation started to atomize and gave way to a decentralized, largely
home-grown patchwork of jihadi groups, linked by ideology and opportunistic
links.
This Egmont Paper1 explores how Belgium reacted to the growth of this new
form of terrorism from its early signs in the 1980s until today. Next, it analyses
the measures taken by the Belgian law enforcement apparatus since 9/11.
Finally, it assesses Belgian specificities in combating jihadi terrorism.
Rik Coolsaet & Tanguy Struye de Swielande2
1. This Egmont Paper is simultaneously published in: Fernando Reinares, ¿Estamos más Seguros?
Democracias Occidentales y Terrorismo Global (Are we Safer? Western Democracies and Global
Terrorism). Madrid, RIE/Ariel, 2007.
2. Rik Coolsaet is Chair of the Department of Political Science at Ghent University (Belgium) and
Director of the Security & Global Governance Programme at Egmont-Royal Institute for Interna-
tional Relations (Brussels). Tanguy Struye de Swielande has been a research fellow at the Egmont
Institute. 5
A Historical Overview
The Belgian police started to investigate the field of political Islam in the mid-
1980s, after a series of terrorist attacks in Paris in 1986, committed by the
‘Fouad Ali Saleh’ network, related to the Iranian regime. Up until that moment
only the civilian intelligence agency, the State Security Service, had been study-
ing the issue, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood. The emergence of this new
form of terrorism, linked to religion, led to the establishment of a specific entity
entirely dedicated to radical Islamism, within the existing Anti-Terrorist Unit of
the Gendarmerie. At that time, the investigators only had a very rough and
superficial understanding of the new phenomenon, since they had been focusing
on the anti-capitalist terrorist threat with which Belgium was confronted in the
early 1980s. As we will see below, for the Belgian police and law enforcement
community a ‘real learning process’ started.3
Belgian authorities soon realised how complex the issue was. In the 1970s, Turk-
ish and Moroccan communities in Belgium had gone trough a profound identity
crisis due to the declining economic fortunes of the first wave of immigrants
from these countries. This manifested itself in a religious revival, particularly
under the influence of an orthodox dawa-strand of Islam, Jamâ’at al-Tablîgh. In
the 1980s, a more political expression gained traction within these communities
under the influence of members of the Muslim Brotherhood who had fled
repression in Egypt and Syria.
Simultaneously, when the former Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 a
solidarity movement among Muslims worldwide developed. From Belgium too,
individuals joined the resistance against the Soviet occupation, sometimes by
their own means, sometimes facilitated by nascent networks, such as the
Mekhtab Al-Khidemat Al-Mujahideen (‘The Office of Services for the Mujahe-
deen’), created by Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam in 1982.
In the early 1990s, France and Belgium were among the first European countries
to be confronted with the aftermath of the Afghan war through its consequences
in Algeria. In 1992 the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) failed to conquer
power via the ballot box. The cancellation of the electoral process by the Alge-
rian military in January 1992 led to the advent of ‘islamo-nationalist’ activism
by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), with Algerian veterans from the Afghan
3. The historical overview draws heavily on to the tremendous work of Superintendent Alain Grig-
nard, in particular his latest essay ‘The Islamist Networks in Belgium: Between Nationalism and
Globalisation’, in Rik Coolsaet (ed.), Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe,
Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007. BELGIUM AND COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY IN THE JIHADI ERA (1986-2007)
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jihad playing a prominent role. This terrorist organisation conducted an increas-
ingly violent campaign against civilians and officials, massacring hundreds of
thousands of Algerians.
Belgian police soon discovered that the Algerian GIA had established cells for
propaganda and fund-raising activities in Belgium too. In 1995 the first concrete
result of the joint police and intelligence cooperation was the dismantlement of
the Zaoui network, a terrorist network linked to the bombing campaign in
France that was to follow soon after, in the summer of 1995. In March already
the Belgian authorities had thus arrested a dozen GIA members, including the
former Algerian FIS-leader Ahmed Zaoui and the Tunesian Tarek ben Habib
Maaroufi. The network was created with the aim of providing logistical support
to GIA’s armed activities in Algeria, but was nevertheless also clearly linked to
the broader Afghan veterans’ diaspora, since members of the Zaoui-network
had been travelling to the Afghan-Pakistan border. More significantly, Belgian
investigators discovered the first ever jihadi manual, 8,000 pages long, produced
by the aforementioned Mekhtab Al-Khidemat and dedicated to Osama bin
Laden. Zaoui and Maaroufi were sentenced to respectively five and three years
in prison (for Maaroufi with a conditional suspension of sentence).
Two years later, this ‘Islamo-nationalist’ phase of the early jihadi networks had
moved into a definitely globalising phase, linked to what was to become al-
Qaeda. The failure of national attempts to install Islamist regimes in Algeria,
Egypt and Syria furthered the development of a mythical global Ummah as a
rallying cry for Islamists worldwide. Afghanistan became the hub of jihadi ter-
rorists. In March 1998, a second jihadi network was dismantled in Belgium
(operation ‘Lock’). Dubbed the Mellouk-network, the arrest of Farid Mellouk
and several other jihadis was made possible thanks to simultaneous indications
from the Belgian, British and Italian intelligence services. It indicated how mul-
tinational jihadi terrorism had now become. Involving terrorists from numerous
countries in the Middle East, it was also linked with the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Many of the terrorists involved had sojourned in training camps in Afghanistan,
including in camps run by al-Qaeda.
During the police raid another important jihadi document was recovered. It was
a pamphlet of some 60 pages representing what might be called the ‘birth certif-
icate’ of the Moroccan Groupe islamique combattant marocain (GICM), a
group based along the model of the GIA. Farid Mellouk was convicted to nine
years in Belgium.
Increasingly, the Afghanistan scene became the primary motive of international
jihadi networking. On 9 September 2001, Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader of theBELGIUM AND COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY IN THE JIHADI ERA (1986-2007)
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anti-Taliban rebellion in Afghanistan, nicknamed ‘lion of the Panjshir’, was
killed by two suicide bombers. The attackers, who died in the attack, were
Abdesattar Dahmane and Baraoui El Ouaer, two Tunisians illegally living in
Belgium. But the real organisers of the network were Omar Sliti and the afore-
mentioned Maaroufi. They were all members of the Tunisian Combat Group, a
Tunisian jihadi group that acted as a logistical network connected to the Paki-
stani-Afghani zone, but also to Northern Iraq (Ansar al-Islam). The network
was completely dismantled in November 2001 (operation ‘Mezze’) and Maar-
oufi arrested for the second time in December 2001 (operation ‘Goal’).
Two days after the September 11 attacks, Nizar Trabelsi was arrested in Brussels
for involvement in an alleged suicide attack against the NATO air force base at
Kleine Brogel – or the American embassy in Paris (operation ‘Wawa’). Trabelsi
was a former professional football player from Tunisian origin. His football
career had not been very successful. He became a cocaine addict and got
involved in petty crime, went to prison and was radicalised while in prison
through the activities of the Takfir wal-Hijra movement. He went to Afghani-
stan, met Osama bin Laden and came back to Belgium, tasked by bin Laden
with setting up a jihadi network.
Trabelsi was linked to Maaroufi, but also to Djamel Beghal, who allegedly
planned the Paris embassy plot and recruited people for al-Qaeda,4 and to Rich-
ard Reid, the ‘shoe bomber’, who attempted to detonate a bomb on American
Airlines flight 63 between Paris and Miami on 22 December 2001. Maaroufi
and Trabelsi were both sentenced in 2003, respectively to six (later to be
increased to seven) and ten years in prison. Other members of the network were
convicted with sentences ranging from two to five years in jail.
The 1998-2001 period represented the apex of al-Qaeda-dominated interna-
tional jihadi terrorism. Cells all over Europe, including in Belgium, were acting
directly under the direction and supervision of al-Qaeda and its two mentors,
Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri. But the military campaign in
Afghanistan that followed the September 11 attacks and the ensuing interna-
tional counterterrorist cooperation broke the backbone of the once disciplined
and hierarchical network, which had operated under a strong central leadership
that controlled almost all aspects of its operations. The network started to atom-
ise. Some Afghan veterans were able to escape through Turkey and Syria and
settled in Europe (the so-called ‘exfiltration of Afghan fighters’). Once in Europe
they launched their local jihad on European soil, creating and maintaining
4. Beghal was arrested at Dubai International Airport in July 2001 and was extradited to France in
September 2001. In 2005 he was sentenced to ten years in prison.BELGIUM AND COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY IN THE JIHADI ERA (1986-2007)
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sleeper cells, assisting other cells if needed, recruiting, preparing or committing
terror plots in their host country. But local dynamics became increasingly impor-
tant, boosting apparently autonomous or independent cells not affiliated, super-
vised or backed, but only inspired by the potent al-Qaeda mythology.
The so-called ‘Maaseik network’, which was dismantled in 2004, offers a good
example of these post-Afghan networks. A group of militants, structured
around Afghan veterans, was discovered living in Maaseik, a small town a few
miles from the Dutch and German borders. The network formed a mix of for-
eigners and locals, Moroccans and Belgians of Moroccan descent. Some had
been trained in Afghanistan, while others were recruited in Belgium. They were
linked to the loosely knit GICM, the same group that had first appeared in
Belgium in 1998. In 2004, Belgian police launched a series of raids throughout
the country (operation ‘Asparagus’, after the vegetable grown in the region),
dismantling the sophisticated network, which in one way or another may have
been linked to the Casablanca and the Madrid bombers. The militants were also
suspected of trying to recruit fighters for the insurgency in Iraq. Although they
did not plan a terrorist attack on Belgian soil, they formed a well organised
logistical support cell, providing for false papers, hideouts, etc. This trial was
the first to be based upon the new 2003 counterterrorism law criminalizing ter-
rorist acts and membership of terrorist groups. Three of the thirteen defendants
were sentenced to a prison term of six to eight years and six received three to
five years.
Parallel to this Afghan-linked jihadi movement, counterterrorism experts in the
police and the State Security Service had also been noticing a growing radicali-
sation process amongst deprived youngsters in immigrant communities, espe-
cially from North-African descent. This process that had started in the 1990s
was likely to increase in the years to come, an internal police report in 2001
forecasted.
If and how this homegrown radicalisation process was going to plug in into the
larger jihadi cause was a main worry for Belgian investigators. In the run-up to
the 2003 Iraq war, the State Security Service had therefore warned about poten-
tial consequences for Belgium. The war and its aftermath indeed enhanced the
radicalisation process, as police officers in the field witnessed. By adding a new
layer of frustration within Muslim communities worldwide, it also pushed
jihadi terrorism into a new dimension, which was part of the ongoing atomisa-
tion of the old al-Qaeda network: a bottom-up terrorist dynamic by self-radical-
ising groups and individuals, no longer directed by al-Qaeda but inspired by its
ideology. Self-recruitment in Europe now appears to have become at least as
important a source of jihadi recruitment as semi-organised international net-BELGIUM AND COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY IN THE JIHADI ERA (1986-2007)
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working. These home-grown terrorists – sometimes small groups of friends,
sometimes ‘lone wolfs’ – can prove to be as dangerous as any known group, if
not more so, because they operate under the radar screen. A number of more or
less spontaneous networks thus emerged, often based on kinship, conveying mil-
itants to Iraq.
The most well-known case in Belgium is the Muriel Degauque-network (2006),
named after a Belgian woman that carried out a suicide attack against an Amer-
ican military patrol in Iraq on 9 November 2005. The network was linked to
the now deceased jihadi leader al-Zarqawi and had been under investigation for
more than four months. The suicide attack prompted the authorities to speed up
the investigation. Three weeks later the homes of different cell members were
raided in Brussels, Charleroi, Tongeren, and Antwerp. Some fifteen persons
were arrested. Their trial is due to begin at the end of 2007.
Glenn Audenaert, the leading Belgian police official in charge of counterterror-
ism, once described jihadi terrorism as ‘patchwork of self-radicalising local
groups with international contacts, but without any central engine and any cen-
tral organisational design’. Today’s jihadi terrorism is thus not very dissimilar
from the anti-capitalist terrorist groups in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s – or
from modern-day criminal networks for that matter, alternately cooperating
and acting autonomously, depending upon the circumstances. The Belgian coun-
terterrorism community now largely subscribes to this assessment. They view
jihadi terrorism basically as a cloak patched together from different sources of
local discontent, real and perceived, with a puritanical and radical interpreta-
tion of Islam providing the stitches and thriving on an enabling global momen-
tum.11
Enhanced Counterterrorism Capabilities
From this bird’s-eye view of the Belgian experience with jihadi terrorism, from
its early start in the mid-1980s until today, one can distinguish three interrelated
characteristics that form the essence of the Belgian approach towards jihadi ter-
rorism: empathy, the search for root causes, and a concern of not encroaching
on fundamental rights.
Before going into these core elements of the Belgian counterterrorism philoso-
phy, we survey the state apparatus’ reaction to the jihadi threat.
Belgium’s EU Presidency on 9/11
Like all EU member states, Belgium swiftly condemned the attacks on Septem-
ber 11. A day later, Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt publicly repeated this
before the European Parliament. Moreover, holding the rotating six-month EU
presidency at the time of the attacks, Belgium offered the EU to become the
privileged and principal channel for trans-Atlantic cooperation on counterter-
rorism – in line with its long-held policy of strengthening the EU’s global role on
the world scene.
Holding the EU Presidency, Belgium thus immediately convened a meeting of the
EU Heads of State and Government together with their Ministers of Foreign
Affairs. This extraordinary European Council, which gathered on 21 September
2001, i.e. only ten days after the tragic events in New York, formally decided to
step up EU action against terrorism, through a coordinated and interdisciplinary
approach, embracing all Union policies. To that end, it adopted a Plan of Action
along five axes: strengthening police and judicial cooperation, developing inter-
national legal instruments, combating the financing of terrorism, strengthening
air security and coordinating the EU’s global action. With regard to the first of
these axes the EU, still under Belgian presidency, saw its police and judiciary
cooperation enhanced. Crucially important among the measures taken were the
elaboration of a common definition of terrorist offences and the adoption of the
European Arrest Warrant, facilitating intra-EU cooperation on terrorism and
the prosecution of suspected terrorists. However, a Belgian proposal to create a
European Intelligence Unit was not approved. Nevertheless the Belgian State
Security Service obtained a consensus among its European intelligence col-
leagues to create a Counter-Terrorism Group.BELGIUM AND COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY IN THE JIHADI ERA (1986-2007)
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With this Action Plan and its accompanying measures, Belgium thus laid down
the basic principles upon which the succeeding EU Presidencies were going to
build to further develop the EU policy against terrorism. These benchmarks can
be broadly summarized as follows: the fight against terrorism requires a com-
prehensive approach by the international community, comprising legal, politi-
cal, economic, diplomatic and military means, fully respecting the rule of law
and in accordance with respective domestic laws, duly taking into account
underlying factors (or ‘root causes’) without acknowledging these as justifica-
tions for terrorist activities. This comprehensive approach implies also the need
for enhancing dialogue and broadening the understanding among cultures and
civilizations. The EU rejects as a principle any attempt to stereotype terrorism
or associate it with any religion, race, nationality or ethnic group. Finally, the
EU recognizes the central role of the UN in establishing standards for combating
terrorism and providing a forum for coordinated action.
State Adaptation to the Jihadi Threat
Preparedness to and the physical prevention of terrorist attacks are the obvious
first level of any counterterrorism strategy. As in all European countries, in Bel-
gium too the capabilities for dealing with terrorism have been significantly
enhanced since 9/11. Budgets and personnel have been increased. Legal provi-
sions have been streamlined along the European framework decisions and the
relevant UN resolutions with their implementing European instruments. Inves-
tigative procedures have been enhanced. Bilateral agreements, including with
the United States, have been concluded.
In Belgium, terrorism has traditionally been chiefly the responsibility of the
intelligence service, but with an increasing involvement of other actors. After
9/11, all services involved were strengthened. Next to the intelligence service,
the central players of the Belgian counterterrorism apparatus became: the fed-
eral prosecutor (whose office was created in May 2002), assisted by the terror-
ism unit in Brussels (PJF/OA3) and the ‘terrorism and sects’ unit within the judi-
cial police (DGJ/DJP). The federal police works in close cooperation with the
two intelligence services, the (civilian) State Security Service, supervised by the
Minister of Justice, and the (military) General Intelligence and Security Service,
supervised by the Minister of Defence. On the ground the collaboration between
the federal police and the civilian intelligence service has always been excellent
and since 2003 it is so on all levels. Even if operational difficulties remain, the
cooperation with military intelligence has also been improved and was sealed by
a formal agreement in November 2004. In 2005, the relations between the fed-
eral prosecutor, the police and the intelligence community were further stream-BELGIUM AND COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY IN THE JIHADI ERA (1986-2007)
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lined and the division of counterterrorism tasks was fine-tuned, under the stew-
ardship of the federal prosecutor.
The civilian intelligence service personnel have been increased by twenty percent
and its budget nearly doubled since 2003. The terrorism unit’s personnel at the
police have been tripled since 2001. Moreover, several magistrates and 13 inves-
tigative judges – Belgian ‘Balthazar Garzons’ – who conduct investigations
related to counterterrorism, were appointed. This was the consequence of a sig-
nificant rise in terrorism-related investigations in 2006, with 106 new files com-
pared to 89 in 2005. The number of judicial investigations also went up: from
14 in 2005 to 26 in 2006. Each investigation is overseen by the specialised inves-
tigative judges.
After 9/11, Belgium also started to add legislative and judicial tools to its existing
means to combat terrorism. In January 2003, Minister of Justice Marc Ver-
wilghen submitted a Governmental Act to Parliament that would henceforth reg-
ulate by law the ‘special investigation methods’ enhancing police capabilities for
search and surveillance (wiretapping, infiltration measures, resort to informers,
special observation measures). As will be described underneath, this Act was
partly annulled by the Court of Arbitration (Constitutional Court), re-submitted
in October 2005 and finally adopted in December 2005. Belgian police forces
now dispose of a particularly advanced legal system in the field of pro-active
work. Specific to the Belgian approach is the permanent control of the applica-
tion of the special investigation measures by the judicial branch. However, a bill
containing the same possibilities for the two intelligence services is still pending
in Parliament. A main issue that will have to be settled before this bill can be
adopted, is the question whether the actual jihadi (and general terrorist) threat
warrants such infringement upon existing procedures and principles.
Belgian anti-terrorism legislation was adopted on 19 December 2003 (Articles
137 to 141ter of the Criminal Code)5 implementing the EU’s Framework Deci-
sion of June 2002 on combating terrorism and the European Arrest Warrant.
The law criminalizes a terrorist act and association with terrorists and imposes
a prison sentence of up to twenty years and in certain cases life sentence (when
related to NBCR).
To better coordinate the information of the different branches and agencies
involved in terrorism-related issues a new ‘nerve centre’ has been created by law
5. Up to 2003 terrorism was not as such included as a misdemeanour in the Belgian penal code.
Sentences were obtained based upon peripheral offences of common law. The Act has been chal-
lenged before the Court of Arbitration (Constitutional Court), which however dismissed the appeal
on 13 July 2005.BELGIUM AND COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY IN THE JIHADI ERA (1986-2007)
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in 2006: OCAM (Organe de Coordination et d’Analyse de la Menace), under
the joint authority of the Ministers of Justice and the Interior. In July 2001
already the idea to create an enhanced inter-services counterterrorism entity had
been floated by Antoine Duquesne, Minister of the Interior, but its implementa-
tion was speeded up by the 9/11 attacks.6
Its main task is to centralize and coordinate the information flows not only
between the different law enforcement services, but also Foreign Affairs, the
Treasury, Customs and the Interior. Moreover, OCAM conducts a general anal-
ysis and evaluation of the threat. The first head of OCAM is Jean-Claude Del-
epière, a magistrate and former head of the Senate’s Committee for the control
of the intelligence services (1999-2006). His Deputy is Luc Verheyden, the
former head of the GIA (Groupe Interforces Anti-terroriste), who thus ensures
the consistency with the earlier Belgian counterterrorism efforts. OCAM indeed
replaces the former GIA that was created in the beginning of the 1980s in the
wake of the Palestinian terrorist attacks in France (against the Goldenberg res-
taurant and a bookshop in de Rue des Rosiers in Paris) and the anti-capitalist
terrorist attacks in Belgium of the early 1980s. Contrary to the former GIA,
where the inter-service cooperation was voluntary, services and departments are
now obliged to share their information within OCAM, lest they be prosecuted
under criminal law.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs too has increased its involvement in counterter-
rorism. In 2005 an Anti-Terrorism unit was created within the MFA. It was
tasked with the coordination of the information from its embassies abroad for
use by OCAM and other relevant authorities in Belgium.
Furthermore, since 1991 the two intelligence services and now also OCAM are
submitted to outside inspection by the aforementioned Committee I.7 The
watchdog for Belgium’s intelligence services works under the direction of the
Belgian Senate. The control concerns the internal rules and guidelines and all the
documents related to the behaviour of its employees, methods and activities.8
According to the latest report of the Committee I, published in April 2007, the
6. La politique de sécurité après les attentats terroristes aux États-Unis d’Amérique. Rapport fait au
nom de la Commission de l’Intérieur et des Affaires administratives. Sénat, 2-924/1, 16 October
2001.
7. This Committee I (officially named Permanent Committee for the Control on the Intelligence
Services) comprises a three member panel, appointed for five years and with a magistrate as its
president, plus a clerk, an administrative cell and an investigation team. Every year the Committee
writes a report on the activities of the intelligence services and makes suggestions to improve the
functioning of the services.
8. Jean-Claude Delepière, ‘Le comité permanent de contrôle des services de renseignement’, in: La
Sûreté. Essais sur les 175 ans de la Sûreté de l’Etat. Brussels, Politeia, 2005, p. 225.BELGIUM AND COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY IN THE JIHADI ERA (1986-2007)
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intelligence services are operating more effectively than before, possess a good
theoretical knowledge of radical Islamism (and jihadism), but need more means
and staff to effectively deal with terrorist threats.
Beyond the federal police and the intelligence services, the government can also
count on the help of the Governmental Coordination and Crisis Centre, created
in April 1988, with Koen Dassen as its first head. The Centre assists the author-
ities in the planning and interdepartmental management of large-scale crises
(such as terrorist attacks and emergencies of all sorts) on Belgian soil.9 The cen-
tre is also an important partner for the private sector in protecting the economy
and vital infrastructure against terrorist attacks. This collaboration resulted
among others in an early-warning system and the publication of a brochure,
Terrorism and extremism: What measures can firms take?10 The centre works
24 hours a day, seven days a week and in case of a crisis coordinates the national
level and supports the local and regional authorities. OCAM, evaluating the
threat on a daily basis, is of course a very important partner of the crisis centre.
In line with the UN, the EU and, especially, the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) rulings, Belgium has increased its efforts to detect and block the financ-
ing of terrorism as well, albeit this aspect is considered to be of lesser importance
in the overall effort, since the sums involved in recent terrorist attacks are of
modest proportion. Based on the anti-money-laundering law of 1993 and
enforced by the Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit, the financial
dimension of counterterrorism falls under the joint supervision of the Ministers
of Justice and Finance. This unit collects and analyzes financial data about pos-
sible terrorist links. The Treasury is responsible for freezing assets belonging to
suspected terrorists. As a result, assets of certain persons and entities associated
with Osama bin Laden, the al-Qaeda network and the Taliban have been frozen
these past years. Most of the suspected transactions however have been cleared
from terrorism links.
Furthermore, Belgian authorities have also enhanced their anti-terrorist cooper-
ation with the U.S. on multiple levels, either bilaterally, or as a member state of
the European Union. Bilaterally, Belgian authorities have joined several Ameri-
can initiatives. For instance, in June 2002, the port of Antwerp joined the
Department of Homeland Security’s Container Security Initiative, that aims at
ensuring that maritime cargo containers posing a terrorism risk are identified
and examined at foreign ports before they are shipped to the United States. Zee-
9. Belgium has a four-phase alert system: phases one and two are at the local level, phase three is a
provincial plan and phase four refers to a national alert. 
10. Rapport d’activités 2005. Brussels, Interior Ministry, Direction générale Politique de Sécurité et
de Prévention, 2006, p. 51.BELGIUM AND COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY IN THE JIHADI ERA (1986-2007)
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brugge followed in 2004. U.S. Customs agents with their Belgian counterparts
screen containers to be loaded on vessels bound for the United States.
Finally, Belgium also contributes in military terms to the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, with a troop presence of some 400 and
4 F-16’s in 2007.17
Which Specificity in Belgian Counterterrorism 
Philosophy?11
The set-up of Belgium’s counterterrorism apparatus is basically similar to that
of its European neighbours. The law enforcement paradigm that dominates the
Belgian counterterrorism approach is also in line with Europe’s traditional atti-
tude of tackling terrorism first and foremost through law enforcement tech-
niques. Finally, Belgium’s refusal to describe jihadi terrorism in terms of an
epochal struggle or to view it as the defining element of the 21st century is shared
by most European countries as well, especially those who have experienced ter-
rorism in their recent past.
Nevertheless, some aspects of its counterterrorism approach and thinking set
Belgium somewhat apart. We refer in particular to the three aforementioned
characteristics: empathy, the search for root causes, and the acute concern for
respecting fundamental rights.
Empathy
Alain Grignard, the leading expert on Islamist and jihadi terrorist groups within
the Belgian police, describes the 1985-1992 period as ‘a real learning process for
the Belgian police forces’.12 One of the main results of this early experience with
this new variety of terrorism was the clearly felt necessity to fully grasp what
drove its militants. One of the critical factors contributing to its success against
jihadi terrorism, according to Grignard, is ‘the empathy one has to entertain
with the subject at hand. This is a characteristic sensibility of some European
countries, including Belgium. This empathy has to start with real knowledge of
the “other”, first empirically, then scientifically, and has to be build upon the
units’ contacts in the field. The approach has to be based on neurons, not hor-
mones. Herein probably resides the real Belgian specificity when dealing with
jihadi terrorism.’13
As mentioned earlier, in the mid-1980s a specific entity entirely dedicated to
radical Islamism was established within the existing Anti-Terrorism Unit of the
police (then called the ‘Gendarmerie’). Police officers indeed realised the urgent
11. The findings in the ensuing paragraphs are in part based upon the results of a four year terror-
ism research project at Ghent University, subsidized by the Fund for Scientific Research-Flanders.
12. Grignard, note 1.
13. Alain Grignard, ‘L’islamisme radical en Belgique, entre nationalisme et globalisation: une vision
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need to understand the dynamics behind this new expression of terrorism. Police
officers enrolled in the university to study the Arabic language, Islamic/Arabic
civilisation, and Islam, in order to get a grip on the issue. Contacts were estab-
lished in the field and a close collaboration was forged with the units of the
intelligence service, as well as with the local police. We got our education in the
streets, as well as in academia, Grignard once quipped.
From these early endeavours police and intelligence officers understood that the
danger did not reside with the Muslim communities as such, but on the contrary
that cooperation with them would be of crucial value in overcoming the com-
mon challenge posed by fringe groups at the margins of these communities,
exploiting widely felt feelings of marginalisation in their midst.14 It ensued that
often great care was given to using non-stigmatising language, both by political
authorities and by the law enforcement community. This was all the more
needed, since an extreme-right political party in the Dutch-speaking northern
part of the country had been gaining strong electoral backing by capitalising on
anti-migrant and anti-Muslim sentiments, thus enhancing an atmosphere
charged with polarising rhetoric. Marino Keulen, the Flemish Minister in charge
of integration, has warned too for the dwindling patience in immigrant commu-
nities and society alike.15
Along the same lines, Koen Dassen, former head of the intelligence service, has
always emphasised that already from the 1970s onwards Belgian governments
had tried to make their citizens from Arab descent aware that the Belgian polity
nourished no anti-Muslim or anti-Arab bias. The presence of communities with
a Muslim background was indeed seen as an irreversible development that one
had to acknowledge.16 As a result, Islam had become one of six religions offi-
cially recognized by the state, thus enjoying the same institutionalized rights as
any other recognized religion, including the right to state subsidies, the right to
religious instruction in public schools, the right to receive remuneration for the
salaries of the clergy, the right to provide chaplains in prisons, hospitals and
asylum reception centers and the right to broadcasting time on public TV and
radio. In this process, the way Islam teaching has been organized in Belgium is
seen as a model by Muslim communities in other EU countries.17
14. Glenn Audenaert, in: Knack, 6 September 2007.
15. Marino Keulen, in: De Morgen, 23 October 2004.
16. Koen Dassen, in: Le Monde, 10 August 2004.
17. Intolerance and discrimination against Muslims in the EU. Developments since September 11.
Vienna, International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, March 2005, pp. 23 and 39-48.BELGIUM AND COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY IN THE JIHADI ERA (1986-2007)
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Addressing the Root Causes
The expertise gained through the early confrontation with Islamist radicals
would soon prove to be of tremendous value when jihadi terrorism gained trac-
tion. Very early on already, police and intelligence officers had become aware
that religion was not of the essence. Frustration was, they rapidly realized, com-
bined with an identity quest. Herein lays the second Belgian counterterrorism
characteristic: the need to understand and address its ‘root causes’.
Frustration, according to Superintendent Grignard, is the main reason why
Muslims radicalise into extremists.18 He has been a constant voice warning that
one should avoid reinforcing the process of exclusion. In this, he is not a lonely
voice within the law enforcement apparatus. His superior, Glenn Audenaert,
and Koen Dassen, as head of the State Security Service, have all been conveying
the same message. Within the counterterrorism community, the vicious circle of
frustration and deprivation is largely seen as the main engine of radicalisation
in Belgium.19
Jihadi terrorism surfs on waves of bitterness, frustration and humiliation,
according to Audenaert. ‘These are the real “ground causes”. […] They have
nothing to do with religion, save for serving as a lever to manipulate vulnerable
people.’20 Police and intelligence officers have clearly been aware that already in
the 1990s radicalisation was increasing among deprived youngsters from Arab
origin – a sentiment in which their family’s Muslim background, their ethnic
origin and their relative lack of opportunities formed a fertile combination for
recruitment and – as it has appeared unmistakably since 2004 – self-radicalisa-
tion. In their city districts, police officers are feeling the impact of international
events – such as the Iraq war, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or even the 2006
Lebanon war – and notice how young people are drawn to jihadi theatres of war
around the globe.
As for individuals having a job still is the major vehicle for socialisation, the
relative scarcity and especially the higher skills that are now required compared
to post-war migratory waves, puts up higher barriers for today’s youngsters in
immigrant communities. In parts of the immigrant communities, despair and
discouragement nowadays prevail with regard to youngsters’ chances of over-
coming this situation in the foreseeable future. There are indeed indications that,
contrary to earlier migratory histories where the third generation in a sense ‘con-
18. Alain Grignard, in: De Tijd, 2 December 2005.
19. For Koen Dassen, see note 14. Glenn Audenaert, in: Humo, 23 March 2004.
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cluded’ the integration itinerary that their grandparents initiated, today’s grand-
children of immigrants dispose of less qualifications and language skills than
their parents, the immigrants’ children.
The attitude of the law enforcement apparatus is in line with the attitude of the
Belgian government. Laurette Onkelinx, the Minister of Justice, declared during
a May 2004 Parliamentary debate that the antiterrorism law enforcement forces
would receive reinforcement to allow, among others, to profile and analyse the
motives and reasons that form the ‘grass roots’ of terrorist recruitment.
‘Root causes’ and more in particular the issue of radicalisation thus quite natu-
rally became one of the major research topics for Egmont – The Royal Institute
for International Relations, when at the end of 2002 it was tasked by the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs to closely monitor the issue of international terrorism.
At the request of the Ministry and the Irish EU presidency, the Institute in 2003
organised the first ever meeting of EU experts of the second (foreign and security
policy) and third (justice and home affairs) pillar, together with representatives
of intelligence services of the member states. The Irish presidency and the ensu-
ing Dutch presidency took advantage of the results of this meeting. In 2004 two
reports were produced by the terrorism working groups from the second and
third pillar. These reports in turn influenced the development of the European
strategy against radicalisation and recruitment, adopted in 2005.21
This specific emphasis on root causes has always been part and parcel of Bel-
gium’s participation in EU counterterrorism endeavours. Within the EU, Belgian
diplomats and officials have continuously stressed the need to incorporate this
dimension within the core of European counterterrorism efforts. As written ear-
lier, the EU Action Plan of September 2001, adopted under the Belgian Presi-
dency, already foresaw a set of accompanying measures in the fight against ter-
rorism, through preventing and stabilising regional conflicts, by engaging in an
in-depth political dialogue with countries and regions in which terrorism might
arise, by pursuing the integration of all countries into a fair world system of
security, prosperity and improved development, by combating any nationalist,
racist and xenophobic drift and by strongly rejecting any equation of terrorism
with the Arab and Muslim world.
In the same spirit, after the 2004 Madrid attacks Belgian diplomats and officials
insisted on including an objective addressing the factors which contribute to
support for and recruitment into terrorism within the ‘EU strategic objectives to
21. Paul Rietjens, ‘België, de EU en het jihadi-terrorisme’, in: Studia Diplomatica, VX, 2007,
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combat terrorism’, annexed to the Declaration on combating terrorism and
adopted by the European Council under the Irish Presidency in March 2004.
This objective included the need to continue to investigate the links between
extreme religious or political beliefs, as well as socio-economic and other fac-
tors, and support for terrorism, with the aim of identifying appropriate policy
responses.
Later on, Belgian diplomats were also adamant to make sure that tackling the
factors or root causes which can lead to radicalisation and recruitment, in
Europe and internationally – as a first objective to prevent people from turning
to terrorism – was clearly included in the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy,
which has been elaborated by the British Presidency after the 2005 London
attacks. The Strategy was adopted by the European Council in December of that
year.
The EU Strategy is based on four pillars: Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond.
The first pillar, ‘Prevent’, is to be understood as ‘stemming the radicalisation
process by tackling the root causes which can lead to radicalisation and recruit-
ment’. In its first draft however, the EU Strategy identified ‘Pursue’ (‘chasing and
investigating terrorists and their networks across our border’) as the first pillar
of EU counterterrorism. Due to the diplomatic efforts of a number of like-
minded countries, including Belgium, the root causes approach prevailed.
These countries have always maintained that international and intra-EU coop-
eration against jihadi terrorism will only be successful if the circumstances are
addressed by which specific individuals are receptive to radicalisation, and why
ultimately some of them turn into terrorists. Without acknowledging the
dynamics that lead these individuals down this path, so they warned, the EU and
its member states will never be able to stay abreast of events, and will constantly
be confronted with the situation that for every ‘radicalised would-be terrorist’
caught, a new one is in the making, the source of potential recruits being seem-
ingly inexhaustible.
At the end of 2006, the EU decided to henceforth forsake the use of the words
‘root causes’ and now instead prefers other terms, such as ‘underlying condi-
tions’ or ‘conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism’, which is the expres-
sion that has been endorsed in the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The reason
for this shift in wording (the EU still used the words ‘root causes’ in its own
Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2005), was the experience of the EU in discus-
sions with third countries, especially at the United Nations. Those discussions
had indicated that the term was open to misinterpretation. The word ‘causes’,
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some terrorist acts could be excused or justified, by seeking to establish an auto-
matic causal link between circumstances and, as a direct result of them, terror-
ism.
Self-radicalisation being extremely fluid, Belgian authorities have shown great
reluctance to quantify the jihadi threat in Belgium, at least publicly. As the assas-
sination of the Dutch movie director Theo van Gogh has indicated, it is not
necessarily the individuals under surveillance that ultimately will act. The same
goes for radical mosques. In the beginning of the 2000s, it was customary to
mention that ten percent of the mosques on Belgian soil were ‘radical’. After-
wards, it was realised that in some cases this depended very much on one single
individual and, even more important, that radicalisation increasingly was taking
place outside customary meeting places such as mosques.
Radicalisation is not an easy process to come to grips with. Like many other
European countries, Belgium too has developed its own national action plan
against radicalisation.
After the Gulf War of 1991 and, especially, the Mellouk and Zaoui operations
police and intelligence services had noticed that a process of radicalisation and
recruitment was taking place around the Algerian GIA-cells. The anti-terrorism
agency of the Belgian Government, the aforementioned GIA (Groupe Inter-
forces Anti-terroriste), was tasked with elaborating the principles for dealing
with this. But only after 9/11 did the Minister of the Interior, Antoine Duquesne,
charge his services with the elaboration of a comprehensive anti-radicalisation
plan. Along this process, it was called by different names, from ‘Plan Iraq’, over
‘Plan Mosque’, until it was formerly adopted in 2006 in its final form as ‘Plan
Radicalism’. The change of name reflects the growing realization that, as men-
tioned before, religion is not the key to understanding today’s radicalisation
process.
From what is publicly known, it is clear that the Belgian authorities have gone
to great lengths to make clear that not Islam is being targeted, but instead
extremist and terrorist acts of whatever origin or justification. The plan concen-
trates on the surveillance of violent, racist, xenophobic and anti-Semite mes-
sages, conveyed through the Internet, radio, television programmes, imams, cul-
tural centres, propaganda and groups. For every issue one law enforcement serv-
ice is put in charge, with other agencies assisting.
Furthermore, the Plan also seeks to empower moderates and to enhance an
atmosphere of security among autochtone and immigrant communities alike.
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lic confidence in the police forces. Moreover as mentioned by Prime Minister
Guy Verhofstadt in his October 2005 State of the Union, all indicators show a
decreasing sense of insecurity among the population at large.
In its actual form, the Belgian Plan Radicalism still privileges tackling the mes-
senger and the message. However necessary, it might prove to be insufficient.
De-radicalisation will not be achieved as long as the circumstances are not
addressed by which specific individuals turn into terrorists, both in Europe and
elsewhere.
Within the police forces, one is clearly aware of the need to go further, judging
from the questions raised by Glenn Audenaert, the leading counterterrorism
officer of the federal police: ‘We need to find an answer to the following ques-
tions: can we identify the root causes of the radicalisation process; can we sub-
sequently understand its dynamics; can we understand and/or explain the evo-
lution from radicalisation to actual jihadi terrorism; and, finally, can we locate
radicalisation and/or terrorism and subsequently anticipate it?’ He realises that
the primary source of knowledge undoubtedly resides in the Muslim communi-
ties themselves, as well as in academia. He has therefore proposed a long-term
co-operation between Muslim communities, academics and law enforcement,
the objective being to transcend scepticism and mistrust among the three pro-
spective partners and to create a ‘win-win’ situation for all the actors involved
in the process. If some form of understanding can be reached, he has pointed
out, initiatives might gradually become reality, insofar as they have the final
objective of identifying and subsequently eradicating the domestic root causes
that are common to all terrorist groups.22
Most of the de-radicalisation strategy will have to take place at the local level,
since the root causes of radicalisation and terrorism are mainly local too. So,
measures taken can best go from local authorities to national authorities and not
vice versa, because each city has its own realities and problems. So the govern-
ment encourages mayors to take measures facilitating the process of integration.
It goes without saying that maintaining open communication channels with for
example community-based social or sports organisations or centres might prove
to be vital. Consequently, proximity police, educators and social workers play
an essential role.23 As explained by Glenn Audenaert: ‘Police forces need to
focus on their performances and on the sociological environment, in which they
evolve. […] police forces need to integrate their action into the entire security
22. Glenn Audenaert, ‘De-radicalisation and the Role of Police Forces’, in: Rik Coolsaet (ed.),
Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe. London, Ashgate, 2007.
23. Vers une politique locale de sécurité intégrale. Brussels, Interior Ministry, Direction générale
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community as well as in the overall dynamic of the society they serve’.24 That
said, local authorities might need to consider enhancing multicultural awareness
programmes for police units operating in specific city districts. This includes
taking care that local agencies, including police forces, reflect the diversity of
society itself – a difficult endeavour in today’s polarised environment, to say the
least.
Safeguarding Fundamental Rights
A last distinctive feature of the Belgian counterterrorism approach is the system-
atic reference to fundamental rights. This reluctance of eroding fundamental
rights in the name of the fight against terrorism and the concern for accounta-
bility are largely shared by all actors involved, officials as well as politicians.25
In 2003 at the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, Minister of For-
eign Affairs Louis Michel explained this Belgian concern as follows:
‘In this context, the Commission on Human Rights has a crucial role to
play in guaranteeing that the international community’s action against
terrorism complies with the fundamental principles of human rights.
Only by respecting human rights can the fight against terrorism lead to
long-lasting results. Fighting terrorism cannot be a pretext for moving
away from the fundamental principles of the impartial state, or for pre-
venting the normal democratic operation of the rule of law. The end does
not justify all means.
Fighting the deep-rooted causes of terrorism definitely helps reinforce
human rights. We cannot avoid the political and economic breeding
ground that fosters terrorism.’
The law enforcement apparatus is clearly in line with this governmental posi-
tion. ‘History indeed teaches us that a democracy in danger needs more democ-
racy, certainly not less,’ according to Glenn Audenaert.26 This apprehension is
at the core of the Belgian refusal to consider ethnic profiling as a means of iden-
tifying potential terrorists. It has undoubtedly also played a role in shaping the
official Belgian position on issues such as the CIA-flights and secret detention
centres, or when it became known that the Brussels-based banking consortium
Swift, the nerve center of the global banking industry, had provided financial
records at the request of the CIA and the FBI, without seeking individual court-
24. See note 20.
25. See also Koen Dassen, note 14.
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approved warrants or subpoenas, and without informing the Belgian govern-
ment.
Paul Rietjens, the former ‘focal point’ for terrorism issues at the Permanent Rep-
resentation of Belgium to the European Union, has stressed that this point was
also a permanent Belgian emphasis during the elaboration of the EU Counter-
Terrorism Strategy.27
The same concern is also present in the issue of terrorism financing. In Belgium,
it must be demonstrated in each case that the group giving financial support
actually constitutes a terrorist group, before being able to freeze their assets. In
the past, FATF members have therefore criticised Belgium for what they con-
sider sub-optimal performance, under the agreed FATF standards on asset freez-
ing.
As part of the mechanisms for safeguarding fundamental rights, judges play a
central role in all state actions related to terrorism. However, the tension
between fundamental rights and counterterrorism remains a delicate balancing
act. As mentioned earlier, the Belgian Constitutional Court (Court of Arbitra-
tion) partly annulled the 2003 governmental act on special investigation meth-
ods on 21 December 2004. In its ruling the Court stressed the need for an inde-
pendent and impartial judicial officer – the examining magistrate rather than the
public prosecutor – to supervise the use of these methods, which are considered
serious infringements on privacy. A new bill on special investigation methods
was tabled by the government in the House of Representatives on 28 October
2005 (and adopted in December) in order not only to draw conclusions from
that judgment, but also to improve the investigation methods used in the fight
against terrorism and serious and organized crime.28 In July 2007, the Consti-
tutional Court annulled additional, but rather minor aspects of this Act, in par-
ticular about its application to fugitives and the status of informers.
Nevertheless, due to this extreme caution shown by the Belgian authorities not
to encroach upon fundamental rights, there have been relatively lesser tensions
between lawyers and human rights activists, on the one hand, and the Belgian
law enforcement apparatus and the government, on the other hand, compared
to neighbouring European countries.
27. See note 19.
28. Report on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union and its member states in
2005. Brussels, E.U. Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, 2005, p. 7727
Conclusion
Building on the expertise gained from dealing with the early Islamist terrorists
in the 1980s and the Algerian GIA in the 1990s, Belgium has succeeded in dis-
mantling eight major networks and convicting more than 60 suspected terror-
ists. One of the reasons explaining this success is the close cooperation that has
been established between the intelligence community and the police. In Belgium
too, counterterrorism has become much more efficient. Moreover, the Belgian
counterterrorism community is particularly aware of the danger of panic reac-
tions, as they could be witnessed in some European countries. Early experiences
with radical Islamism and jihadi terrorism have indeed permitted to build up the
indispensable expertise and awareness of this challenge, so as to avoid these
hitches when jihadi terrorism gained traction in the 1990s.
Jihadi activism and terrorism in Belgium is no island, entire of itself. It reflects
the same Europe-wide evolution of radical Islamism and jihadi terrorism. Immi-
grant communities with an Arab-Muslim background have acted as a sounding
board for all the frustrations that run across the Arabo-Muslim and the Muslim
world. And as in other parts of the world, radicalisation in Europe is primarily
grounded in local root causes.
Even if one lacks precise instruments to quantify the degree of radicalisation,
authorities and social workers alike have noticed an increasing tendency to rad-
icalise. This in itself should not be viewed with excessive alarm. Being radical is
not illegal. Moreover, the Belgian counterterrorism community is evidently
aware that radicalism can take a wide variety of forms and appearances – and
that it certainly is not limited to Arab-Muslim communities alone. It can be
expressed through a political, religious or social discourse. It can be non-violent
or violent. When violent, the Belgian counterterrorism community knows, it is
always the action of a few within the larger group or community whose fate is
at stake and whose plight they invoke to try to justify their acts. Radical groups
still remain a marginal minority within the Muslim communities. They form
fringe groups that act as self-declared vanguard groups. In all past processes of
radicalisation throughout history the number of individuals who chose violence
as their privileged method has been extremely small. Radicalisation leading to
violence, and especially its systematic form, namely terrorism, is indeed only the
far end of a wide array of possible radical attitudes and expressions. It cannot
be overcome but with the cooperation of the communities that are most affected
by it.